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Abstract	  In	  Crowder’s	  reformulation	  of	  Berlin’s	  argument,	  not	  only	  does	  value	  pluralism	   provide	   support	   for	   liberalism,	   it	   actually	   suggests	   a	  version	   of	   liberalism	   that	   promotes	   the	   public	   use	   of	   personal	  autonomy.	  For	  Crowder,	  personal	  autonomy	  is	  a	  necessary	  element	  given	  value	  pluralism	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  individual	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  plurality	  of	  incommensurable	  options.	  In	  order	  to	  advance	  personal	  autonomy,	   Crowder	   advocates	   a	   robust	   account	   of	   freedom	   of	   exit	  coupled	  with	  a	  form	  of	  autonomy-­‐facilitating	  education.	  To	  this	  effect	  Crowder	  posits	  that	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  non-­‐liberals	   in	   order	   to	  promote	   individual	   autonomy	  as	   a	   public	   ideal.	  However,	   I	   argue	   that	   despite	   the	   positive	   implications	   that	   a	   pro-­‐autonomy	  account	  of	  liberalism	  may	  have	  for	  both	  the	  individual	  and	  the	   state,	   it	   will	   limit	   range	   of	   acceptable	   values	  within	   the	   liberal	  state	  and	  thus	  undermine	  certain	  aspects	  of	  value	  pluralism.	  	   Key	  words:	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Value	  Pluralism:	  Outline	  and	  Implications	  Value	  pluralism	   is	  most	   often	   associated	  with	   the	  work	   of	   Isaiah	  Berlin.	  While	  Berlin	  did	  not	  develop	  his	  thesis	  of	  value	  pluralism	  in	  a	  systematic	  or	  coherent	  fashion,	  his	   important	  contributions	  to	  this	   topic	  can	  be	   located	  throughout	  his	  substantial	  body	  of	  work.	  As	  noted	  by	  George	  Crowder	  and	  Henry	  Hardy,	  “Berlin	  had	   not	   written	   a	   systematic	   account	   of	   this	   topic	   [value	   pluralism],	   central	  though	   it	   was	   to	   his	   thought,	   and	   his	   scattered	   remarks	   were	   tantalizingly	  incomplete	   and,	   at	   times,	   frustratingly	   unclear	   or	   even	   (it	   seemed)	  contradictory.”1	  Despite	  the	   fragmented	  nature	  of	  Berlin’s	  writing,	   it	   is	  possible	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to	   determine	   distinct	   elements	   of	   his	   value	   pluralism.	   In	   the	   analysis	   of	   both	  Crowder	   and	   Steven	   Lukes,	   Berlin’s	   value	   pluralism	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	  following	   four	   key	   elements:	   (1)	   the	   existence	   of	   universal	   values;	   (2)	   the	  plurality	  of	  values;	  (3)	  conflict	  among	  values;	  and	  (4)	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  many,	  but	  not	  all,	  values.2	  	  	  Berlin	   developed	   his	   thesis	   of	   value	   pluralism	   partly	   as	   a	   rebuttal	   to	   the	  development	   of	   monism	   in	   both	   moral	   and	   political	   thought.	   In	   its	   broadest	  sense,	   moral	   monism	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   all	   ethical	   questions	   possess	   a	   single	  correct	  answer,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  possible	  for	  all	  answers	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  a	  single	  and	  coherent	  moral	  system.3	  All	  other	  forms	  of	  morality	  and,	  by	  extension,	  political	  association	  are	  considered	  defective	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  fall	  short	  of	  the	   standard	   set	   out	   by	   the	  monist	   super-­‐value.	   Alternatively,	   they	   have	   value	  only	   insofar	  as	   they	  are	  a	  necessary	  step	  on	  the	   trajectory	   towards	   this	  monist	  super-­‐value.	  With	  an	  acknowledgement	   to	   the	  ancient	  Greek	  originators	  of	   this	  reductionist	   method,	   Berlin	   calls	   this	   search	   for	   the	   elusive	   monist	   value	   the	  “Ionian	  fallacy”.	  This	  is	  the	  flawed	  belief	  that:	  	   all	  genuine	  questions	  must	  have	  one	  true	  answer	  and	  one	  only,	  all	  the	  rest	  being	   necessarily	   errors;	   in	   the	   second	   place,	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	  dependable	  path	  towards	  the	  discovery	  of	  these	  truths;	  [and]	  in	  the	  third	  place,	  that	  the	  true	  answers,	  when	  found,	  must	  necessarily	  be	  compatible	  with	   one	   another	   and	   form	   a	   single	   whole,	   for	   one	   truth	   cannot	   be	  incompatible	  with	  another	  –	  this	  we	  know	  a	  priori.4	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Examples	  of	  such	  forms	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  monism	  include	  Plato’s	  theory	  of	  the	  forms,	  utilitarianism	  and	  its	  various	  accounts	  of	  utility,	  and	  anarchism.	  	  Berlin	   suggests	   that	  we	   should	  be	  wary	  of	  moral	   and	  political	  monism	   for	   two	  important	  reasons.	  First,	   it	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  evidence	  of	  both	  human	  history	  and	   human	   experience.	   Monism	   does	   not	   accurately	   represent	   the	   depth	   and	  continued	   persistence	   of	   conflict	   in	   the	   human	   experience.	   Instead,	   as	   Berlin	  notes,	   “the	  world	  that	  we	  encounter	   in	  ordinary	  experience	   is	  one	   in	  which	  we	  are	   faced	   with	   choices	   between	   ends	   equally	   ultimate,	   and	   claims	   equally	  absolute,	  the	  realization	  of	  some	  of	  which	  must	  inevitably	  involve	  the	  sacrifice	  of	  others.”5	  Second,	   and	   perhaps	  more	   importantly	   for	   Berlin	   given	   the	   Cold	  War	  context	   in	   which	   he	   was	   writing,	   monism	   has	   provided	   the	   foundation	   for	  authoritarianism	  and	   totalitarianism,	  which	  were	   the	   cause	  of	   so	  much	  human	  suffering	   and	   death	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   While	   Berlin	   is	  careful	  to	  note	  that	  monism	  does	  not	  automatically	  result	  in	  authoritarianism	  or	  totalitarianism,	   the	   intellectual	   roots	   of	   these	   extreme	   regimes	   can	   always	   be	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  belief	  in	  monism;	  monism	  always	  possesses	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  such	  regimes,	  as	  both	  authoritarian	  and	  totalitarian	  ideologies	  require	  the	  belief	  in	  utopianism.6	  	  Much	   has	   been	   written	   about	   the	   differing	   interpretations	   and	   political	  implications	  of	  Berlin’s	   thesis	  of	  value	  pluralism.	  To	   this	  effect,	   three	  divergent	  political	   positions	   have	   emerged	   from	   these	   debates.	   The	   first	   takes	   as	   its	  starting	  point	  a	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  Berlin’s	  plurality	  of	  values.	  Plurality,	  in	  this	   context,	   is	   understood	   as	   referring	   to	   a	   plurality	   of	   different	   cultures	   and	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ways	  of	  life,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  plurality	  among	  or	  within	  goods.7	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  plurality	  is	  that	  there	  will	  exist	  a	  diverse	  collection	  of	  different	  cultures	  and	  ways	  of	  life.	  If	  ways	  of	  life	  and	  the	  political	  and	  moral	  goods	  they	  entail	  are	  both	  plural	   and	   incommensurable,	   then	   we	   have	   no	   rational	   or	   a	   priori	   reason	   to	  prioritize	   liberalism	   over	   any	   other	   form	   of	   political	   association.	   Accordingly,	  value	   pluralism	   generates	   a	   number	   of	   valid	   forms	   of	   political	   association,	   of	  which	  liberalism	  is	  but	  one.	  This	  interpretation	  therefore	  denies	  any	  positive	  link	  between	  value	  pluralism	  and	   liberalism.	  This	   leads	   to	   a	   form	  of	  politics	   that	   is	  based	   on	   modus	   vivendi,	   where	   different	   forms	   of	   political	   association	   seek	  peaceful	  coexistence	  through	  negotiation	  and	  compromise.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  value	   pluralism	   is	   most	   often	   associated	   with	   John	   Gray	   and	   his	   thesis	   of	  “agonistic	  liberalism”.8	  	  	  The	   second	   interpretation	   of	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   value	   pluralism,	   as	  advocated	   primarily	   by	   William	   Galston,	   does	   provide	   a	   positive	   link	   to	  liberalism.9	  Here	  we	  see	  a	  shift	  from	  pluralism	  referring	  to	  different	  cultures	  and	  ways	   of	   life,	   to	   a	   form	   of	   pluralism	   among	   goods	   and	   values	   themselves.	  According	  to	  Galston,	  value	  pluralism	  suggests	  that	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  values	  are	  equally	  valid.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  value	  pluralist	  account	  of	  plurality	  argues	  that	  goods	  and	  values	   such	  as	   tradition,	   equality,	   community	   and	   solidarity	   are	  not	  inherently	  superior	  or	   inferior	  to	   liberty,	  as	  they	  all	  possess	  value.	  Accordingly,	  value	   pluralism	   leads	   to	   a	   defence	   of	   liberalism	   as	   it	   is	   the	   form	   of	   political	  association	  best	  suited	  to	  maximally	  accommodating	  this	  mixture	  of	  both	  liberal	  and	  non-­‐liberal	  values	  within	  the	  state.	  For	  Galston,	  value	  pluralism	  supports	  a	  form	  of	  liberalism	  that	  shares	  many	  characteristics	  with	  Reformation	  liberalism,	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particularly	  its	  focus	  on	  toleration	  and	  state	  neutrality.	  This	  Reformation	  account	  of	   the	   state	   is	  preferable	  as	   it	   allows	   for	   the	   “expressive	   liberty”	  of	   its	   citizens,	  allowing	   them	   to	   lead	   their	   lives	   as	   they	   see	   fit	   “within	   a	   broad	   range	   of	  legitimate	  variation,	   in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  what	  gives	  life	  meaning	   and	   value.”10	  In	   contrast	   to	  Gray’s	   interpretation,	   here	  we	   see	   the	  debate	  focusing	  on	  what	  happens	  within	  the	  state	  as	  opposed	  to	  between	  states.	  	  The	   third	   interpretation	   also	   provides	   a	   positive	   link	   between	   value	   pluralism	  and	   liberalism.	   However,	   unlike	   Galston’s	   account,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   form	   of	  toleration-­‐based	   Reformation	   liberalism.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   a	   form	   of	   autonomy-­
facilitating	   liberalism	   that	   shares	   many	   characteristics	   with	   Enlightenment	  liberalism.	  As	  value	  pluralism	  generates	  a	  range	  of	  valid	  goods,	  both	  moral	  and	  political,	  it	  requires	  that	  the	  individual	  be	  able	  to	  make	  reasoned	  choices	  among	  such	  options.	  Accordingly,	  it	  implies	  a	  strong	  defence	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  liberalism	  in	  which	   the	   facilitation	   of	   autonomy	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	   legitimate	   political	   ideal.	  Perhaps	   the	   strongest	   proponent	   of	   this	   third	   position	   is	   Crowder,	   and	   it	   is	   a	  detailed	  examination	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  this	  argument	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  This	   paper	   will	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   main	   sections.	   The	   first	   will	   examine	  Crowder’s	   argument,	  which	   provides	   a	   positive	   link	   from	   value	   pluralism	   to	   a	  specific	  form	  of	  autonomy-­‐facilitating	  liberalism.	  The	  second	  section,	  which	  will	  constitute	   the	   crux	  of	   this	   paper,	  will	   be	   a	   critical	   evaluation	  of	   the	  autonomy-­
facilitating	  aspect	  of	  Crowder’s	  argument.	  In	  particular,	  this	  section	  will	  examine	  Crowder’s	   twin	   arguments	   of	   freedom	   of	   association	   and	   exit,	   and	   autonomy-­‐
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facilitating	  education,	  as	  legitimate	  aspects	  of	  public	  policy.	  I	  conclude	  that	  while	  a	   pro-­‐autonomy	   liberalism	  may	   produce	   both	   individual	   and	   societal	   benefits,	  the	  restrictions	  that	  it	  places	  on	  acceptable	  forms	  of	  pluralism	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  central	  thrust	  of	  value	  pluralism.	  	  	  
From	  Value	  Pluralism	  to	  Liberalism:	  Crowder’s	  Argument	  While	  Crowder	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  examination	  of	  Berlin’s	  contribution	  to	  political	  thought	  and	  the	  history	  of	  ideas,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  he	  who	  has	  been	  more	  responsible	  than	   anyone	   else	   for	   the	   development	   and	   exposition	   of	   value	   pluralism	   as	   an	  important	   and	   coherent	   contribution	   to	   both	   moral	   and	   political	   philosophy.	  Central	   to	   Crowder’s	   contribution	   is	   the	   argument	   that	   value	   pluralism	   leads	  logically	   to	   a	   form	   of	   liberalism	   that	   is	   distinctly	   pro-­‐autonomy.	   This	   is	   not	   a	  position	   that	   Crowder	   has	   always	   held.	   Indeed,	   in	   his	   earlier	   work	   on	   value	  pluralism,	   published	   in	   1998,	   Crowder	   argued	   that	   there	   was	   no	   positive	  relationship	  between	  value	  pluralism	  and	  liberalism:	  	   I	  cannot	  claim	  to	  have	  exhausted	  the	  possibilities	  for	  arguing	  from	  meta-­‐ethical	  pluralism	  to	  liberalism	  but	  I	  think	  it	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  all	  the	   arguments	   I	   have	   considered	   is	   strong	   evidence	   for	   the	   following	  general	   conclusion:	   value	  pluralism	  has,	   of	   itself,	  no	  tendency	  to	  support	  
the	  case	  of	  liberalism.11	  	  	  In	   Crowder’s	   initial	   analysis,	   not	   only	   does	   value	   pluralism	   fail	   to	   provide	   a	  justification	   for	   liberalism,	  but	   it	  may	   instead	   result	   in	   illiberal	  outcomes:	   “Not	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only	   does	   [value]	   pluralism	   provide	   no	   support	   for	   liberalism,	   it	   positively	  undermines	  the	   liberal	  case,	  since	   it	   is	  always	  open	  to	  the	  pluralist	   to	  ask,	  why	  not	   the	   illiberal	   option?”12	  Crowder’s	   position	   in	   this	   earlier	   manifestation	   is	  congruent	  with	  that	  of	  Gray	  and	  the	  first	  of	  the	  three	  positions	  outlined	  above.	  	  However,	  despite	  his	  earlier	  misgivings,	  Crowder	  now	  holds	  that	  value	  pluralism	  does	   in	   fact	   provide	   a	   coherent	   and	   logical	   defence	   for	   liberalism.	   More	  specifically,	   value	   pluralism	   provides	   a	   defence	   for	   a	   form	   of	   liberalism	   that	  encourages	  and	  prioritizes	  the	  capacity	  for	  autonomous	  decision	  making	  within	  the	   individual.	   In	   this	   context,	   Crowder	   holds	   that	   “value	   pluralism	   generates	  arguments	  that	  decisively	  favour	  pro-­‐autonomy	  liberalism	  over	  the	  liberalism	  of	  group	   toleration.”13	  This	   is	   not	   a	   defence	   of	   autonomy	   that	   is	   premised	   on	  Kantian	  metaphysics,	   but	   rather	   one	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   instrumental	   benefits	  that	   autonomous	   decision	   making	   can	   provide	   the	   individual	   within	   an	  environment	  characterized	  by	  a	  plurality	  of	  incommensurable	  values.	  	  In	   order	   to	   understand	   Crowder’s	   specific	   line	   of	   argument,	   which	   provides	   a	  positive	   link	   between	   value	   pluralism	   and	   (a	   pro-­‐autonomy	   account	   of)	  liberalism,	   we	   must	   first	   examine	   briefly	   Berlin’s	   attempt	   to	   do	   likewise.	  Crowder	   identifies	   in	   Berlin’s	   work	   two	   arguments	   that	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	  positive	   link	   from	   value	   pluralism	   to	   liberalism.	   The	   first	   focuses	   on	   choice:	   if	  value	  pluralism	  is	  true,	   then	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  value	  of	   freedom,	  as	  freedom	  is	  required	  to	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  between	  competing	  options.14	  Crowder	  rejects	  this	  argument	  as	  it	  contains	  “an	  obvious	  logical	  flaw”	  in	  that	  it	  violates	  “Hume’s	  law”	  by	  attempting	  to	  derive	  values	  from	  facts.15	  More	  specifically,	  Berlin	  attempts	  to	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move	   directly	   from	   arguing	   that	   choice	   is	   unavoidable	   to	   valuing	   freedom	   of	  choice	  itself.	  However,	  just	  because	  something	  is	  unavoidable	  does	  not	  mean	  it	  is	  inherently	  valuable.	  	  The	   second	   argument	   that	   Crowder	   identifies	   focuses	   on	   the	   impossibility	   of	  moral	   and	   political	   perfection.	   Value	   pluralism	   rejects	   monism	   and	   therefore	  rejects	   the	   possibility	   of	   political	   perfection.	   Accordingly,	   it	   should	   promote	   a	  form	   of	   political	   association	   which	   both	   accommodates	   and	   facilitates	   this	  inescapable	  imperfection,	  rather	  than	  a	  form	  which	  attempts	  to	  overcome	  it.	  This	  suggests	  the	  form	  of	  Reformation	  liberalism	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  Locke	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  toleration	  and	  human	  imperfection.	  However,	  for	  Crowder,	  this	  line	  of	   argumentation	   is	   weak	   as	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   an	   argument	   from	   value	  pluralism	  to	  liberalism	  and	  only	  liberalism.	  While	  Reformation	  liberalism	  is	  anti-­‐utopian,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  form	  of	  political	  association	  to	  be	  so.	  Conservatism	  also	  shares	  this	  sceptical	  approach	  towards	  human	  perfection.	  	  	  In	  order	   to	   avoid	   the	  violation	  of	  Hume’s	   law	   that	  Berlin	   falls	   foul	  of,	   Crowder	  will	  need	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  his	  argument	  does	  not	  pass	  from	  fact	  to	  value,	  but	  rather	   from	   value	   to	   value.	   It	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   show	   that	   liberalism	   is	   one	  possible	  outcome;	  rather,	  if	  Berlin’s	  pluralism	  is	  true,	  then	  Crowder	  will	  need	  to	  show	   that	   liberalism	   is	   a	   necessary	   outcome,	   and	   is	   best	   suited	   both	   to	  accommodate	   and	   to	   facilitate	   pluralism.	   Crowder	   believes	   that	   this	   is	   indeed	  possible,	   and	   to	   make	   it	   so	   he	   turns	   away	   from	   the	   defence	   of	   Reformation	  liberalism	  and	  instead	  moves	  towards	  a	  formulation	  of	  liberalism	  that	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  Enlightenment	  liberalism.	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  As	   with	   the	   first	   argument	   from	   value	   pluralism	   to	   liberalism	   that	   Berlin	  proposes,	   Crowder’s	   argument	   also	   revolves	   around	   the	   issue	   of	   choice.	  However,	  whereas	  Berlin	  focuses	  on	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  necessity	  of	  choice	  to	   valuing	   the	   ability	   to	  make	   such	   choices,	   Crowder	   focuses	   on	   the	   character	  traits	   required	  by	   those	  who	  must	  make	  such	  choices,	   in	  particular	   those	  hard	  choices	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  value	  incommensurability.	  	  	  Pluralism	   forces	   the	   individual	   to	   make	   choices.	   As	   there	   exists	   a	   plurality	   of	  values	   and	   goods,	  which	   are	   at	   times	   in	   conflict,	   and	  which	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  order	  against	  some	  other	  ultimate-­‐value,	  Berlin’s	  pluralism,	  if	  correct,	  forces	  the	  individual	  to	  make	  choices.	  It	  is	  at	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  individual	  makes	  such	  a	  choice	  that	  Crowder’s	  argument	  from	  pluralism	  to	  liberalism	  is	  situated.	  At	  this	  point,	  there	  are	  essentially	  two	  options:	  to	  select	  one	  option	  over	  the	  other	  on	  a	  purely	  arbitrary,	   if	  not	  random,	  basis;	  or	  to	   follow	  a	  particular	  course	  of	  action	  for	   “a	   good	   reason”.16 	  Crowder’s	   argument	   from	   pluralism	   to	   liberalism	   is	  contingent	   upon	   providing	   individuals	   with	   the	   intellectual	   tools	   that	   enable	  them	   to	   formulate	   such	   “good	   reasons”.	   In	   Crowder’s	   reformulation	   of	  Berlin’s	  argument	   from	   choice,	   these	   intellectual	   tools	   are	   only	   associated	   with	   the	  specific	   liberal	   virtue	   of	   personal	   autonomy,	   as	   it	   is	   only	   through	   the	   use	   of	  autonomy	   that	   such	   choices	   can	   be	   made	   for	   “a	   good	   reason”,	   as	   opposed	   to	  arbitrarily	  or	  randomly.	  	  There	  is	  at	  play	  here,	  however,	  an	  important	  assumption	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Crowder,	  and	   this	   is	   something	   that	   he	   openly	   admits. 17 	  Crowder’s	   defence	   will	   be	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successful	   only	   if	   the	   individual	   actually	   wants	   to	   make	   choices	   for	   “a	   good	  reason”.	  If	  the	  individual	   in	  question	  wishes	  to	  submit	  their	   life	  to	  the	  winds	  of	  fate	   and	   choose	   arbitrarily	   or	   at	   random,	   then	   Crowder’s	   argument	   fails.	  Crowder	  believes,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  sufficient	  justification	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  reason	  and	  reasoned	  decision	  making	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  To	  this	  extent,	  Crowder	  draws	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  who	  argues	  that	  reason	  −	   interpreted	  widely	  as	  meaning	  to	   incorporate	  practical	  reasoning	  and	   critical	   reflection	  −	   is	   a	   vital	   human	   function	   as	   it	   allows	   the	   individual	   to	  “organize	  and	  arrange	  all	  of	   the	  …	  other	   [human	   functions],	  giving	   them	   in	   the	  process	   a	   characteristically	   human	   shape.” 18 	  More	   recently,	   Nussbaum	   has	  incorporated	  practical	   reason	   into	   her	   “capabilities	   approach”,	   noting	   that	   it	   is	  essential	  as	  it	  enables	  the	  individual	  to	  “form	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  critical	  reflection	  about	  the	  planning	  of	  one’s	  own	  life.”19	  Without	  this	  capacity	   for	   reason	   and	   reasoned	   decision	   making,	   it	   would	   be	   impossible	   to	  select	   between	   incommensurable	   values.	   Any	   choices	   made	   in	   this	   condition	  would	  be	  random,	  “arbitrary,	  incoherent	  and	  perhaps	  self-­‐defeating.”20	  Crowder	  is	  not	  so	  bold	  as	  to	  argue	  that	  a	   life	  without	  the	  capacity	   for	  reasoned	  decision	  making	   is	   devoid	   of	   value.21	  Rather	   that	   if	   pluralism	   is	   true,	   those	   individuals	  who	  do	  possess	  this	  capacity	  for	  reasoned	  decision	  making	  are	  better	  placed	  to	  make	  such	  important	  decisions	  given	  the	  options	  presented	  to	  them,	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  possess	  such	  a	  capacity.	  As	  Crowder	  argues,	  	   Pluralism	   does	   not	   imply	   indifference;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   it	   stresses	   the	  intrinsic	   value	   of	   many	   goods.	   Practical	   reasoning	   is	   essential	   to	   the	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honouring	   of	   these	   goods.	   Since	   practical	   reasoning	   under	   pluralism	  requires	   personal	   autonomy,	   respect	   for	   plurality	   requires	   autonomous	  thinking.22	  	  To	   aid	   our	   capacity	   for	   reasoned	   decision	   making	   in	   the	   harsh	   light	   of	  incommensurability,	   Crowder	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   develop	   four	   particular	  virtues	  and	  dispositions	  of	  character.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  “open-­‐mindedness”	  we	  require	  in	  order	  to	  take	  the	  plurality	  of	  values	  seriously.23	  Berlin’s	  pluralism	  shows	  us	  that	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  valid	  human	  values	  and	  goods,	  and	  these	  possess	  some	  form	  of	  moral	  parity	  as	  there	  is	  no	  form	  of	  external	  metric	  against	  which	  to	  quantify	  them.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  valid	  forms	  of	  human	  flourishing	  connected	  to	  these	  values	  and	  goods.	  	  	  While	  Crowder	  makes	  no	  specific	  mention	  of	  them,	  incorporated	  under	  this	  first	  “virtue”	   are	   the	   characteristics	   of	   Reformation	   liberalism,	   in	   particular	   the	  promotion	   of	   tolerance	   as	   a	   political	   virtue.	   Tolerance,	   at	   its	   simplest,	   is	  demonstrated	  when	  an	  individual	  or	  institution	  refrains	  from	  interfering	  with,	  or	  extends	   a	   form	   of	   permission	   for,	   the	   practices	   or	   beliefs	   with	   which	   they	  disagree.24	  While	  we	   as	   individuals	   or	  members	   of	   a	   particular	   group	  may	   not	  see	   the	   merit	   in	   all	   of	   the	   values	   and	   forms	   of	   human	   flourishing	   validated	  through	   Berlin’s	   pluralism,	   we	   do	   need	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   for	   other	   people	  they	  are	  of	  merit	  and	  are	  therefore	  valued.	  	  Secondly,	  because	  of	   the	   implications	  of	   value	   incommensurability,	  we	  need	   to	  be	  aware	  of	   the	   inescapable	  reality	  of	   the	  consequences	  of	  our	  decisions.25	  The	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choices	  that	  we	  make	  have	  real	  consequences,	  both	  moral	  and	  political.	  When	  we	  choose	  to	  follow	  a	  particular	  course	  of	  action,	  we	  must	  do	  so	  from	  a	  position	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  evaluate	  our	  options	  and	  acknowledge	  that	  our	  decision	  may	  have	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  outcomes.	  Following	  Berlin,	  Crowder	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  “realism”.26	  Similarly,	   Glen	   Newey	   refers	   to	   it	   as	   “agent-­‐regret”,	   in	   that	  we	   are	  often	   faced	  with	   the	   “tragic	   choice”	   scenario	  whereby	  we	   acknowledge	   that	   in	  order	  to	  pursue	  certain	  values	  others	  will	  need	  to	  be	  sacrificed.27	  	  Thirdly,	  as	  pluralism	  necessarily	  entails	  the	  rejection	  of	  abstract	  rules	  and	  forms	  of	  thinking	  and	  ordering	  that	  exist	  a	  priori,	  it	  should	  make	  pluralists	  both	  aware	  of	  and	  attentive	  to	  the	  particular	  details	  of	  choice-­‐making	  situations,	  “including	  the	  claims	  and	  circumstances	  of	   those	  people	  affected	  by	   the	  choice.”28	  Here,	   it	  appears	   that	   Crowder	   is	   influenced	   by	   Kant’s	   doctrine	   of	   respect	   for	   the	  individual.	  	  Finally,	  we	  come	  to	  the	  value	  of	  mental	   flexibility.	  As	  pluralism	  rejects	  monism	  and	   the	   recourse	   to	   a	  monist	   super-­‐value,	   the	   individual	  who	   is	   attempting	   to	  determine	   a	   course	   of	   action	   through	   practical	   reasoning	   will	   need	   to	   make	  decisions	   that	   relate	   to	   their	   specific	   situation.	   As	   these	   situations	   change,	  pluralists	  must	  possess	  sufficient	  flexibility	  within	  their	  mental	  architecture	  to	  be	  able	   to	   accommodate	   such	   changes.	   As	   Berlin	   notes,	   “the	   concrete	   situation	   is	  almost	  everything.”29	  	  	  In	   order	   for	   individuals	   to	   be	   able	   to	   make	   reasoned	   choices	   between	  incommensurable	  moral	  or	  political	  values	   in	  any	  given	  situation,	  they	  must	  be	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able	   to	   judge	   for	   themselves	  what	   to	   do.	   They	   no	   longer	   have	   recourse	   to	   the	  monist	  super-­‐value,	  as	   this	   is	  ruled	  out	  by	  pluralism,	  and	  thus	  the	   individual	   is	  forced	   to	  make	   these	  difficult	   decisions	   independently,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  specifics	   of	   each	  particular	   case.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   good	   life	   is	  subject	  to	  constant	  disagreement	  and	  will	  inevitably	  change	  over	  time,	  it	  cannot	  be	   used	   as	   a	   base	   from	   which	   to	   permanently	   premise	   our	   decision	   making.	  These	  bases	  must	  themselves	  remain	  open	  to	  constant	  analysis	  and	  revision,	  and	  this	  is	  possible	  only	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  personal	  autonomy.30	  	  The	   argument	   that	   Crowder	   proposes	   is	   that	   these	   four	   pluralist	   virtues	   and	  character	  traits	  −	  open-­‐mindedness,	  realism,	  the	  rejection	  of	  abstract	  rules,	  and	  mental	  flexibility	  −	  are	  also	  distinctively	  and	  uniquely	  liberal	  virtues.	  The	  crux	  of	  his	  argument	  is	  that	  in	  order	  for	  individuals	  not	  only	  to	  choose	  but	  to	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  for	  good	  reason	  among	  any	  given	  set	  of	  incommensurables,	  they	  require	  a	   particular	   mental	   architecture	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   mental	  architecture	   is	  best	   expressed	  as	   the	   ability	   to	   exercise	  personal	   autonomy.	  As	  Crowder	   concludes,	   “Pluralism,	   in	   short,	   imposes	   on	   us	   choices	   that	   are	  demanding	   to	   a	   degree	   such	   that	   they	   can	   be	  made	  well	   only	   by	   autonomous	  agents.	  If	  pluralism	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  best	  lives	  will	  be	  characterized	  by	  personal	  autonomy.”31	  	  	  
The	  Tensions	  Within	  Crowder’s	  Liberal	  Pluralism	  The	  emphasis	  that	  a	  value	  pluralist	  understanding	  of	  liberalism	  places	  upon	  the	  diversity	  and	  pluralism	  inherent	  in	  human	  nature	  may	  prove	  beneficial	  to	  those	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who	  are	   concerned	  with	   the	  demands	  of	  pluralism.	  Value	  pluralism	  recognizes	  that	  diversity	  and	  conflict	  are	  an	  inevitable	  part	  not	  only	  of	  liberal	  tradition	  but	  also	   of	   being	   human.	   A	   liberalism	   grounded	   in	   value	   pluralism	   is,	   potentially,	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   open	   to	   the	   desires	   and	   needs	   of	   groups	   that	   have	   been	  historically	  marginalized,	  such	  as	  women	  and	  various	  cultural	  or	  ethno-­‐religious	  communities.	   It	   will	   allow	   these	   groups	   to	   challenge	   the	   strict	   application	   of	  values	  such	  as	  liberty	  and	  equality,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  traditional	  classification	  of	  life	  into	   the	   public	   political	   and	   private	   non-­‐political	   spheres.	   Furthermore,	   it	   will	  allow	   the	   state	   space	   in	   which	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   the	   construction	   and	  implementation	   of	   these	   various	   structures	   and	   values,	   given	   the	   detrimental	  effects	  they	  have	  on	  these	  marginalized	  groups.32	  	  A	   liberal	   polity	   informed	   by	   value	   pluralism	   may	   be	   congruent	   with	   certain	  forms	   of	  multiculturalism	   and	   cultural	  minorities.	   As	   this	   reformulation	   of	   the	  liberal	   polity	   places	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   public	   use	   of	   autonomy,	   it	   may	   be	  acceptable	  to	  those	  who	  demand	  special	  or	  differentiated	  rights	  for	  such	  ethno-­‐religious	  communities	  while	  simultaneously	  positing	  that	  such	  communities	  still	  hold	  that	  individual	  autonomy	  is	  a	  value	  of	  fundamental	  importance.	  (This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Crowder’s	  defence	  of	  a	  robust	  right	  of	  exit	  and	  an	  account	  of	  autonomy-­‐facilitating	  education,	  both	  of	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  following	  sections.)	  Indeed,	  Crowder	  notes	  that	  on	  this	  point	  there	  are	  similarities	  between	  his	  work	  and	  that	  of	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  who	  argues	  that	  cultural	  membership	  is	  important	  as	  it	   allows	   individuals	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   their	   life	   choices.33	  While	   Crowder	   and	  Kymlicka	   take	   very	   different	   justificatory	   paths,	   their	   conclusions	   are	   quite	  similar.	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  However,	  it	  is	  my	  contention	  that	  Crowder	  is	  blind	  to	  the	  potentially	  restrictive	  and	  exclusionary	  effects	  of	  his	  account	  of	  liberal	  value	  pluralism.	  This	  problem	  is	  not	  located	  in	  any	  theoretical	  deficiency	  or	  misreading	  of	  Berlin,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  actual	   social	   and	   political	   implications	   of	   his	   thesis.	   As	   I	   have	   already	   stated,	  value	   pluralism	   forces	   the	   individual	   to	  make	   choices	  −	   often	   tragic	   choices	  −	  between	   incommensurable	   options.	   For	   Berlin,	   this	   means	   that	   being	   free	   to	  choose	  is	  of	  importance,	  and	  this	  capacity	  is	  best	  achieved	  through	  liberalism	  as	  liberalism	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   the	   political	   expression	   of	   negative	   liberty.	  However,	  as	  Crowder	  notes,	  this	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  Hume’s	  law.	  What	  is	  important,	  Crowder	  argues,	   is	  not	  only	  being	  free	  to	  make	  decisions	  but	  also	  being	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	   for	   good	   reasons	  within	   any	   given	   context.	   As	   the	   contexts	   for	  our	  decisions	   change,	   so	   too	  must	   our	   reasons	   for	  making	   such	  decisions.	   It	   is	  only	   liberalism	  that	  allows	  us	   to	  develop	   the	  mental	  architecture	  necessary	   for	  making	   such	   decisions	   in	   fluid	   contexts.	   Thus,	   a	   liberalism	   that	   is	   grounded	   in	  value	  pluralism	  not	  only	  frees	  the	  individual	  to	  make	  decisions	  but	  also	  furnishes	  them	  with	  the	  skill	  set	  necessary	  for	  making	  such	  decisions	  for	  good	  reason.	  	  In	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  social	  and	  political	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  for	  “a	  good	  reason”,	  Crowder	  believes	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  is	  therefore	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  of	  public	  policy.	  As	  Crowder	  writes,	   “I	   conclude,	   then,	   that	   pluralist	   multiculturalism	   will	   be	   framed	   by	  Enlightenment	   liberal	   principles	   that	   include	   a	   public	   commitment	   to	   the	  facilitation	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  among	  all	  citizens.”34	  Indeed,	  for	  Crowder,	  this	  gives	   rise	   to	   both	   negative	   and	   positive	   duties	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   state:	   not	   only	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should	   the	   state	   remove	   boundaries	   that	   restrict	   an	   individual’s	   ability	   to	  exercise	  personal	  autonomy	  (negative	  duties),	  but	  it	  should	  also	  help	  individuals	  acquire	   the	   skills	   that	   allow	   them	   to	  make	   such	  decisions	   (positive	  duties).	   To	  this	   effect,	   negative	   duties	   are	   achieved	   through	   a	   robust	   account	   of	   an	  individual’s	   “right	   of	   exit”,	   and	   positive	   duties	   are	   achieved	   through	   a	   distinct	  form	  of	  liberal	  education	  that	  facilitates	  or	  enables	  the	  individual	  to	  develop	  and	  employ	  autonomy	  when	  it	  is	  deemed	  necessary.35	  	  	  I	   argue,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   two	   duties	   through	  public	   policy	   that	   we	   can	   see	   the	   emergence	   of	   tensions	   within	   Crowder’s	  account	  of	   liberal	  value	  pluralism,	  which	  may,	  ultimately,	  undermine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   it	  can	  facilitate	  and	  accommodate	  a	   true	  plurality	  of	  values.	  The	  exact	  nature	  of	  these	  tensions	  will	  become	  clear	  through	  a	  detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  right	  of	  exit	  and	  of	  an	  autonomy-­‐facilitating	  liberal	  education.	  	  
Autonomy	  and	  the	  Right	  of	  Exit	  Freedom	   of	   association	   is	   an	   important	   characteristic	   of	   the	   modern	   liberal	  democratic	   polity.	   Within	   such	   polities,	   citizens	   are	   often	   members	   of	  associations,	   such	   as	   academic	   associations,	   sporting	   clubs,	   political	   parties,	   or	  churches.	   Membership	   in	   such	   diverse	   forms	   of	   association	   reflects	   the	  heterogeneous	   nature	   of	   the	   modern	   liberal	   democratic	   polity.	   A	   corollary	   of	  freedom	  of	  association	   is	   freedom	  of	  disassociation,	  or	   the	  right	  of	  exit.	  Within	  the	   modern	   liberal	   democratic	   polity,	   membership	   of	   any	   of	   these	   forms	   of	  association	  must	  be	  voluntary.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  distinctly	  illiberal	  polity	  that	  forced	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an	   individual	   to	   join	   a	   particular	   association,	   such	   as	   a	   (state-­‐sanctioned)	  political	  party	  or	  religion.	  	  	  Voluntary	   membership	   is	   perhaps	   most	   clearly	   expressed	   when	   an	   individual	  chooses	   to	   join	   an	   association	   of	   which	   they	   are	   currently	   not	   a	  member.	   For	  example,	   I	   may	   currently	   not	   be	   a	   member	   of	   a	   cricket	   club,	   and	   in	   order	   to	  demonstrate	  my	  appreciation	  for	  the	  game,	  decide	  to	  join	  local	  cricket	  club	  “A”.	  Similarly,	  due	  to	  a	  change	  in	  my	  geographic	  circumstances,	  I	  may	  choose	  not	  to	  renew	  my	  membership	  with	  “A”	  and	  instead	  become	  a	  member	  of	  my	  new	  local	  cricket	   club	   “B”.	   These	   two	   examples	   demonstrate	   an	   uncontroversial	   account	  (at	  least	  within	  the	  liberal	  discourse)	  of	  voluntary	  membership	  –	  I	  have	  chosen,	  without	  coercion,	  to	  join	  association	  “A”,	  and	  then	  to	  switch	  my	  allegiance	  from	  association	   “A”	   to	   association	   “B”.	   Within	   liberal	   democracies	   this	   form	   of	  voluntary	  association	  is	  most	  evident	  in	  sporting	  clubs	  and	  political	  parties.	  	  	  This	   is	   very	  different,	  however,	   from	  membership	  of	   an	  association	   into	  which	  one	  is	  born,	  rather	  than	  chooses	  to	  enter,	  such	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐religious	  community.	  How	   do	   individuals	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   have	   chosen	   freely	   to	   remain	   a	  member	   of	   an	   association	   or	   community	   they	   were	   born	   into?	   Person	   A’s	  decision	   to	   join	   religion	   X	   is	   a	   less	   problematical	   demonstration	   of	   voluntary	  membership	  than	  person	  B’s	  membership	  of	  religion	  X	  if	  the	  latter’s	  membership	  was	   due	   to	   the	   circumstances	   of	   their	   birth.	  While	   they	   are	   both	  members	   of	  religion	  X,	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  for	  B	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  their	  initial	  and	  continued	  membership	  is	  voluntary.36	  In	  this	  context,	  an	  individual	  demonstrates	  genuine	  −	  that	   is	   to	   say	   voluntary	   −	   freedom	   of	   association	   through	   their	   continued	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membership	  even	  though	  they	  are	  given	  the	  option	  to	  leave.	  When	  an	  individual	  refuses	   to	   exercise	   their	   right	   of	   exit	   from	   an	   association,	   their	   continued	  membership	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  constituting	  voluntary	  membership.	  	  However,	   this	   specific	   interpretation	   of	   voluntary	   association	   and	   freedom	   of	  exit	  assumes	  that	  the	  only	  reason	  why	  an	  individual	  has	  not	  exercised	  their	  right	  of	  exit	  is	  because	  they	  desire	  to	  continue	  their	  membership.	  It	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  situations	  where	  an	  individual	  may	  wish	  to	  exercise	  this	  right,	  but	  where	  the	   costs	   involved	   are	   too	   prohibitive	   to	   do	   so.	   As	   Neil	   Burtonwood	   notes,	  “Membership	  of	  communities	  based	  on	  religion	  or	  culture	   is,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  the	  outcome	  of	  birth	  and	  [therefore]	  exit	  from	  such	  a	  community	  is	  of	  a	  different	  order	  from	  resigning	  membership	  of	  the	  local	  golf	  or	  tennis	  club.”37	  This	  may	  be	  an	   issue	   for	  minorities,	  but	   it	   is	  a	  more	  pressing	   issue	   for	   those	  members	  who	  feel	  oppressed	  within	  such	  minorities.	  	  Within	  the	  modern	  liberal	  democratic	  polity,	  members	  of	  minorities	  tend	  to	  be	  at	  a	  greater	  disadvantage	  than	  members	  of	  the	  dominant	  demographic,	  often	  facing	  challenges	  that	  the	  latter	  would	  not	  encounter.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  incorrect	  to	  assume	   that	   these	  minority	   groups	   are	  homogenous;	   even	  within	   such	   groups,	  internal	  minorities	  can	  and	  do	  develop.	  These	  sub-­‐groups	  are	  often	  particularly	  vulnerable.	  As	  Leslie	  Green	  brings	  to	  our	  attention,	  “Minorities	  are	  badly	  off,	  but	  internal	  ones	  are	  often	  worse	  off.	  They	  suffer	   from	  being	  members	  of	  minority	  groups	  who	  need	  to	  defend	  themselves	  not	  only	  from	  the	  majority	  but	  also	  from	  other	   members	   of	   their	   own	   minority.”38	  	   Within	   the	   academic	   literature	   of	  feminism,	  sociology,	  and	  cultural	  studies,	  this	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  intersectionality.39	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Within	   the	   specific	   context	   of	   minorities,	   Avigail	   Eisenberg	   and	   Jeff	   Spinner-­‐Halev	  refer	  to	  “minorities	  within	  minorities”.40	  	  Examples	  of	  such	  vulnerable	  groups	  within	  minorities	  often	  include	  women	  and	  children,41	  as	   well	   as	   members	   of	   the	   lesbian,	   gay,	   bisexual,	   and	   transgender	  (LGBT)	  community.	  Women	  within	  such	  communities	  are	  often	  presented	  with	  limited	   educational	   opportunities,	   limits	   to	   control	   over	   their	   own	   sexuality	  (sometimes	  enforced	  through	  violence),	  and	  forced	  marriages.	  Children,	  as	  James	  G.	   Dwyer	   notes,	   are	   often	   “involuntary	   and	   unwitting	   participants”	   in	   such	  communities.42	  In	   such	   situations,	   particular	   members	   of	   these	   communities	  within	   the	   liberal	   state	  may	   feel	   that	   their	   cultures	   are	   excessively	  patriarchal,	  and	   are	   therefore	   detrimental	   to	   women	   and	   children.	   Similarly,	   those	   who	  identify	  as	  LGBT	  and	  who	  are	  members	  of	  such	  restrictive	  communities	  may	  feel	  unable	   to	  express	   their	   true	  sexuality	   for	   fear	  of	   isolation,	  expulsion,	  or	  violent	  acts.	  	  The	   traditional	   liberal	   defence	   against	   such	   restrictive	   behaviour	   is	   the	  individual’s	  right	  of	  exit.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  all	  individuals	  are	  protected	  against	  such	  intra-­‐group	  oppression	  if	  they	  are	  free	  to	  leave	  such	  an	  oppressive	  group.	  If	  they	   are	   denied	   this	   right,	   it	   becomes	   very	   difficult,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   for	   the	  individual	  to	  escape	  such	  oppressive	  practices.43	  But	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  free	  to	  leave	  a	  group	  in	  this	  context?	  What	  is	  it	  that	  actually	  constitutes	  the	  ability	  to	  leave?	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Does	  a	  strict	  negative	  interpretation	  of	  liberty	  help	  us	  here?	  In	  a	  negative	  liberty	  understanding	   of	   the	   right	   of	   exit,	   all	   that	   is	   required	   to	   be	   free	   is	   that	   the	  individual	   is	   not	   prevented	   from	  doing	   so	   by	   the	   use	   of	   force,	   or	   the	   threat	   of	  such	   use.44	  But	   this	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   various	   “costs”	   that	   the	  individual	   may	   suffer	   as	   a	   direct,	   or	   even	   indirect,	   result	   of	   their	   decision	   to	  exercise	   their	   right	   of	   exit.	   An	   individual	   may	   be	   so	   embedded	   within	   a	  community	   that	   they	  know	  of	  no	  other	  way	  of	   life.	   It	  may	  be	   that	  not	  only	  are	  their	  friends	  and	  families	  connected	  to	  this	  way	  of	  life,	  but	  so	  also	  may	  be	  their	  way	   of	   thinking.	   Even	   if	   we	   exclude	   issues	   of	   violence	   (both	   physical	   and	  emotional),	  to	  exit	  this	  way	  of	  life	  would	  not	  only	  mean	  (potentially)	  losing	  one’s	  friends	  and	  family,	  but	  also	  being	  removed	  from	  an	  environment	  that	  gives	  one’s	  life	  meaning	   through	  a	  shared	  context.	  To	  what	  extent	  do	   these	  “costs”	  restrict	  the	  freedom	  of	  exit?	  	  	  In	  The	  Liberal	  Archipelago,	  Chandran	  Kukathas	  identifies	  two	  opposing	  positions	  regarding	  this	  important	  question.	  The	  first	  concludes	  that	  these	  additional	  costs	  in	  fact	  negate	  this	  “freedom	  of	  exit”.	  In	  reality,	  an	  individual	  “would	  be	  unfree…if	  exit	   were	   extremely	   costly	   –	   as	   it	   often	   is.”45	  Kukathas	   provides	   us	   with	   the	  example	   of	   Amish	   teenagers:	   while	   they	   are	   free,	   in	   that	   there	   are	   no	   overt	  barriers	   limiting	   their	  ability	   to	  remove	  themselves	   from	  their	  community,	   this	  freedom	  comes	   at	   the	  unreasonable	   cost	   of	   their	   family,	   friends,	   and	  property.	  While	  no	  one	   is	  physically	   forcing	   them	   to	   stay,	   their	   freedom	   to	  exit	   is	  not	   as	  simple	   as	   merely	   not	   being	   actively	   prevented	   from	   doing	   so.	   As	   Kukathas	  concludes,	  “they	  are	  not	  [free].”46	  The	  Amish	  teenager	  is	  embedded	  too	  deeply	  in	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their	   community	   to	   simply	   walk	   away	   without	   incurring	   substantial	   costs	   to	  themselves,	  both	  mental	  and	  financial.	  	  Opposed	  to	  this	  position	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  these	  additional	  costs,	  extreme	  as	  they	   may	   be,	   do	   not	   negate	   an	   individual’s	   right	   of	   exit.	   At	   the	   core	   of	   this	  position	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   ultimately,	   within	   a	   liberal	   democratic	   polity,	   an	  individual	   still	   has	   the	   choice	   to	   leave	   their	   community.	   These	   additional	   costs	  may	   make	   this	   process	   more	   difficult,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   remove	   this	   course	   of	  action	   as	   a	   legitimate	   and	   viable	   option.	   As	   Kukathas	   notes,	   these	   costs	   “may	  have	   a	   large	   bearing	   on	   the	   decision	   taken;	   but	   [they	   have]	   no	   bearing	   on	   the	  individual’s	   freedom	   to	   take	   it.”47 	  While	   there	   are	   undoubtedly	   substantial	  obstacles	   that	  make	   the	  Amish	   teenager’s	   decision	   to	   leave	   their	   community	   a	  difficult	  one,	   they	   still	  do	  possess	   the	  option	   to	  do	   so.	  A	  difficult	  option	   is	   still,	  nonetheless,	  an	  option.	  	  Kukathas	   rejects	   this	   second	   approach,	   and	   instead	   advocates	   a	   strict	   negative	  liberty	   interpretation	   of	   the	   right	   of	   exit,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   following	  extract	  from	  The	  Liberal	  Archipelago:	  	  	   Consider	   the	   case	  of	   Fatima,	   the	  wife	  of	   a	  Malay	   fisherman	   living	   in	   the	  state	  of	  Kelantan	  on	  Peninsular	  Malaysia.	  She	  is	  a	  Muslim,	  a	  mother,	  and	  a	  wife;	   and	   her	   life	   is	   very	  much	   shaped	   by	   these	   aspects	   of	   her	   identity,	  and	  also	  by	  her	  membership	  of	   the	  village	  community,	  which	  reinforces	  the	  view	  –	  her	  view	  –	  that	  her	  life	  should	  be	  governed	  by	  her	  religion	  and	  her	   duties	   as	   wife	   and	   mother.	   She	   has	   no	   desire	   to	   live	   elsewhere	   or	  
	   22	  
otherwise.	  If	  she	  did	  wish	  to	  live	  in	  some	  other	  way	  she	  probably	  would	  have	  to	  live	  elsewhere,	  since	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  village	  would	  tolerate	  –	  let	  alone	  welcome	  –	  any	  deviation.	  Is	  Fatima	  free?48	  	  It	   is	  Kukathas’	  contention	  that	  Fatima	  is,	   in	  fact,	   free.	  While	  there	  are	  still	  costs	  involved,	  she	  is	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  community	  in	  which	  she	  is	  embedded;	  no	  one,	  other	  than	  herself,	  is	  stopping	  her	  from	  leaving.	  By	  implication,	  therefore,	  she	  is	  also	  free	  “if	  she	  does	  not	  have	  any	  wish	  to	  leave	  −	  even	  if	  she	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  leaving	  or	  living	  differently	  −	  and	  simply	  continues	  to	  live	  her	  life.	  A	  society	  of	  villages	  such	  as	  Fatima’s	  is,	  on	  the	  view	  offered	  here,	  a	  free	  society	  −	  whatever	   else	   may	   be	   said	   about	   it.”49	  Kukathas	   is	   aware	   that	   his	   specific	  interpretation	  of	  the	  right	  of	  exit	  is	  open	  to	  question.	  He	  concedes	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  Fatima	  is	  free	  because	  she	  is	  autonomous	  and	  has	  chosen	  freely	  her	  particular	  course	  of	  action,	  as	  this	  is	  simply	  not	  the	  case.	  As	  Kukathas	  notes,	  “she	  has	  not	  ‘chosen’	  it;	  she	  has	  simply	  not	  rejected	  it.	  She	  has	  acquiesced	  in	  a	  life	  she	  has	  been	  raised	  to	  lead,	  but	  she	  has	  not	  embraced	  it.”50	  	  	  How,	   then,	   does	   Kukathas	   consider	   Fatima	   to	   be	   free?	   It	   is	   his	   opinion	   that	  Fatima	  is	  free	  “because	  she	  may	  live	  a	  life	  she	  has	  not	  rejected	  and	  is	  not	  forced	  to	  live	  a	  life	  she	  cannot	  accept.”51	  This	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  freedom	  that,	  contrary	  to	  Kant’s	   reasoning,	   is	   dependent	   upon	   autonomy	   or	   any	   form	   of	   self-­‐direction.	  Rather,	   for	   Kukathas,	   Fatima	   is	   free	   because	   she	   possesses	   “liberty	   of	  conscience”.	  While	   this	  may	   be	   a	   deviation	   from	   the	   negative	   liberty	   informed	  account	  of	  freedom,	  and	  therefore	  of	  a	  free	  society,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  Kukathas’	  
	   23	  
understanding	   of	   what	   a	   liberal,	   and	   therefore	   free,	   society	   should	   be.	   As	  Kukathas	  argues,	  	   A	  society	   is	   free	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   its	  members	  do	  not	  have	   to	   live	   lives	  they	  cannot,	  in	  good	  conscience,	  accept.	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  a	  society	  will	  not	  be	  free	  simply	  because	  there	  are	  many	  options	  open	  to	  individuals.	  It	  can	  only	   be	   free	   if	   individuals	   can	   dissociate	   themselves	   from	   options	   they	  cannot	  abide.52	  	  	  Thus,	  while	  Kukathas	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  may	  be	  costs	  involved	  −	   indeed,	  quite	  high	  costs	  −	  when	  an	  individual	  wishes	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  of	  exit,	   this	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  that	  individual’s	  freedom	  to	  exercise	  such	  a	  right.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  position	  that	  Crowder	  shares.	  For	  Crowder,	  a	  viable	  right	  of	  exit	   is	  more	   than	  simply	   the	   lack	  of	   restrictive	  practices.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  context	  that	  Kukathas’	  argument	  is	  problematic,	  as	  it	  refuses	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  reality	  that	   these	   additional	   costs	   have	   for	   the	   individual	   in	   question.	   This	   can	   be	  illustrated	   by	   returning	   to	   the	   example	   of	   women	  within	   a	   liberal	   democratic	  polity	   who	   may	   wish	   to	   leave	   their	   community	   due	   to	   excessive	   patriarchal	  practices	   that	   are	   inimical	   to	   their	   personal	   autonomy.	   Here	   we	   can	   see	   how	  difficult	   their	   right	   of	   exit	   is	   in	   reality.	   Drawing	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Susan	   Moller	  Okin,53	  Crowder	  correctly	  points	  out	  that	  women’s	  “choices	  in	  these	  contexts	  are	  severely	   limited	   by	   lack	   of	   education,	   since	   girls	   are	   frequently	   thought	   less	  worthwhile	  educating	   than	  boys,	   and	  by	  damaging	  education	  designed	   to	   train	  girls	   to	   accept	   confining	   gender	   roles.” 54 	  The	   unfortunate	   result	   of	   these	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restrictive	   practices	   is	   that	   they	   tend	   to	   leave	   the	   individual	   in	   such	   a	   limited	  state	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  exiting	  such	  communities	  is	  rarely	  an	  option.	  Okin	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  following	  example:	  	   The	   words	   of	   a	   seventeen-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half-­‐year	   old	   Indian	   student	   from	   Fiji	  capture	   the	   dilemmas	   such	   young	   women	   face.	   Suddenly	   faced	   with	   a	  coerced	  marriage	  that	  would	  not	  allow	  her	  to	  graduate	  from	  high	  school,	  she	   said:	   “I	   don’t	   know	   what	   to	   do	   now.	   My	   dreams	   and	   plans	   are	   all	  messed	   up.	   …I	   am	   tormented.”	   But	   when	   a	   teacher	   suggested	   that	   she	  need	   not,	   perhaps,	   go	   through	   with	   the	   marriage,	   she	   responded	  indignantly:	   “In	   our	   religion,	   we	   have	   to	   think	   of	   our	   parents	   first.	   It	  would	   kill	   them	   if	   I	   ran	   away	   and	   disobeyed	   them.	  …For	  me,	   I	   couldn’t	  marry	  someone	  who	  wasn’t	  a	  Muslim.	  I	  will	  do	  it	  the	  Muslim	  way.	  And	  I	  would	  never	  go	  against	  my	  parents!”55	  	  For	   Crowder,	   what	   is	   required,	   therefore,	   is	   a	   right	   of	   exit	   that	   is	   more	   than	  simply	  not	  being	  obstructed,	  or	  not	  being	  threatened	  with	  violence.	  We	  need	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	   right	  of	  exit	   that	   takes	   into	  account	   the	  various	  obstacles	  and	  costs	  that	  one	  may	  encounter.	  As	  Crowder	  argues,	  “Crucially,	   it	  seems,	  real	  freedom	   of	   exit	   seems	   to	   involve	   the	   capacity	   to	   stand	   back	   from	   the	   group’s	  norms	   and	   to	   assess	   them	   critically	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	  
judgement.”56	  How	   does	   an	   individual	   develop	   this	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	  judgement?	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   hypothetical	   liberal	   society	   that	   would	   be	  characterized	  by	  Rawls’	   political	   liberalism,	   in	   order	   for	   the	   individual	   to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  autonomous	  judgements	  they	  must	  be	  educated	  to	  do	  so.57	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Autonomy-­Facilitating	  Liberal	  Education	  In	   order	   to	   prevent	   the	   type	   of	   social	   conditioning	   that	   works	   against	   the	  capacity	  for	  autonomous	  judgement,	  and	  that	  therefore	  restricts	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  of	  exit,	  Crowder	  argues	  that	  we	  need	  to	  encourage	  “the	   development	   in	   children	   of	   a	   form	   of	   character	   in	   which	   serious	   thought	  along	   these	   [autonomous]	   lines	   is	   possible	   and	   valued.”58	  It	   is	   not	   enough	   that	  autonomy	  is	  required;	  rather,	  the	  argument	  actively	  promotes	  the	  “facilitation	  of	  individual	   autonomy.” 59 	  Crowder	   is	   aware	   that	   by	   linking	   autonomy	   to	  education,	  he	  could	  be	  guilty	  of	  advocating	  a	  form	  of	  comprehensive	  liberalism,	  and	   thus	   suggesting	   a	   move	   towards	   a	   moral	   monist	   account	   of	   liberal	  perfectionism.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  a	  charge,	  Crowder,	  drawing	  upon	  the	  work	  of	   Harry	   Brighouse,60	  draws	   a	   distinction	   between	   “autonomy-­‐promoting”	   and	  “autonomy-­‐facilitating”	  forms	  of	  liberal	  education.61	  	  	  An	  autonomy-­‐promoting	  form	  of	  liberal	  education	  would	  be	  inexorably	  linked	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  doctrine	   (such	  as	  Enlightenment	   liberalism),	  as	   it	  would	  shift	  autonomy	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   student’s	   life	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	  employ	   it	   whenever	   possible.	   In	   contrast,	   an	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	   form	   of	  liberal	   education	   aims	   to	   “enable	   them	   to	   live	   autonomously	   should	   they	  wish	  to.”62	  It	  would	  operate	  in	  the	  same	  abstract	  way	  as	  the	  teaching	  of	  languages	  or	  mathematics,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   student	  would	  have	   the	   capacity	   to	  use	   these	  skills,	   but	   need	   not	   use	   them	   continuously.	   While	   a	   student	   may	   have	   the	  capacity	   to	   speak	   a	   foreign	   language,	   they	   will	   only	   do	   so	   when	   the	   need	   or	  desire	   arises.	   As	   Brighouse	   notes,	   “The	   [autonomy-­‐facilitating]	   argument	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suggests	  that,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  people’s	  lives	  go	  better	  when	  they	  deploy	  the	   skills	   associated	   with	   autonomy,	   but	   does	   not	   yield	   any	   obligation	   to	  persuade	   them	   to	   deploy	   them:	   autonomy	  must	   be	   facilitated,	   not	   necessarily	  promoted.”63	  Crowder	  concurs	  explicitly	  with	  Brighouse	  on	  this	  point,	  suggesting	  that:	  	  	   the	   Enlightenment-­‐liberal	   state	   need	   only	   facilitate	   autonomy,	   not	  promote	   it.	   Such	   a	   state	   need	   only	   ensure,	   principally	   through	   the	  education	  system,	  that	  its	  citizens	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  live	  autonomously;	  it	   need	   not	   demand	   that	   its	   citizens’	   lives	   be	   comprehensively	  autonomous	  in	  content,	   like	  the	  energetically	   innovative	  lives	  celebrated	  by	  J.	  S.	  Mill.64	  	  It	   is	   Crowder’s	   contention,	   therefore,	   that	   a	   form	   of	   liberal	   education	   that	   is	  autonomy-­‐facilitating,	   as	   opposed	   to	   autonomy-­‐promoting,	   will	   enable	  individuals	   to	  make	  decisions	   autonomously	  without	  undermining	   any	  of	   their	  other	   cultural	   values.	   While	   Crowder	   does	   acknowledge	   that	   this	   may	   “bring	  changes	  to	  a	  traditional	  society,”65	  the	  central	  thrust	  of	  his	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  is	  erroneous	   to	   think	   that	   traditional	   (ethno-­‐religious)	   practices	   are	   necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive	  of	   the	   liberal	   facilitation	  of	  an	   individual’s	   capacity	   to	  make	  decisions	  autonomously.66	  	  While	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  what	  Crowder	  is	  trying	  to	  achieve	  in	  his	  bifurcation	  of	  autonomy	   into	   its	   moral	   (autonomy-­‐promoting)	   and	   instrumental	   (autonomy-­‐facilitating)	   aspects,	   it	   is	  my	   contention	   that	   he	   is	   too	   optimistic	   regarding	   the	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extent	  to	  which	  this	  division	  can	  be	  successfully	  maintained.	  The	  distinction	  that	  Crowder	   envisages	   may	   work	   at	   the	   abstracted	   level	   of	   ideal	   theoretical	  scenarios,	   but	   when	   it	   is	   actually	   implemented	   at	   the	   level	   of	   real-­‐world	  application	   (that	   is	   to	   say	   in	   the	   classroom	   environment),	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	  boundaries	  that	  separate	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  autonomy	  would	  be	  less	  robust,	  and	  more	   porous,	   than	   Crowder	   imagines.	   Accordingly,	   at	   the	   level	   of	   practice,	   it	  would	   be	   very	   difficult	   to	   disentangle	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	   education	   from	  autonomy-­‐promoting	  education.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  that	  Crowder	  fails	  to	  acknowledge.	  Indeed,	  this	  oversight	  of	  Crowder’s	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Brighouse,	   whose	   work	   Crowder	   draws	   on,	   acknowledges	   openly	   that	   the	  collapse	   between	   these	   two	   forms	   of	   autonomy	   is	   a	   distinct	   possibility:	  “Although	  the	  methods	  recommended	  will	  be	  more	  somber	  than	  evangelizing,	  it	  may	   be	   hard	   to	   distinguish	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	   from	   autonomy-­‐promoting	  education	  in	  practice.”67	  	  	  It	   is	   on	   this	   important	   point	   that	   parallels	   can	   be	   drawn	   between	   Crowder’s	  emphasis	   on	   a	   form	   of	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	   liberal	   education	   and	   the	  educational	   demands	   of	   Rawls’	   promotion	   of	   autonomy	   within	   the	   public	  political	  sphere.	  In	  Rawls’	  later	  work,	  particularly	  Political	  Liberalism,	  autonomy	  is	   promoted	   as	   a	   political	   rather	   than	   a	   moral	   good.	   The	   justification	   for	   this	  politicization	  of	  autonomy	  is	  to	  avoid	  the	  restrictive	  effects	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  form	  of	  perfectionist	  liberalism,	  such	  as	  that	  developed	  in	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  For	  Rawls,	  autonomy	  is	  to	  be	  promoted	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  allows	  individuals	  to	  make	  decisions	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   constitutional	   essentials	   of	   society,	   as	   opposed	   to	  being	  a	  necessary	  metaphysical	  element	  that	  provides	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  good	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life.	   Yet,	   as	   Andrea	   Baumeister	   correctly	   brings	   to	   our	   attention	   in	   relation	   to	  Rawls,	   and	   contrary	   to	   what	   Crowder	   argues,	   it	   is	   wrong	   to	   assume	   that	  autonomy	   can	   be	   compartmentalized	   and	   brought	   out	   only	   when	   required.	   In	  this	   sense,	   the	   learning	   of	   autonomy,	   even	   in	   its	   facilitating	   context,	   cannot	   be	  equated	  with	  the	  learning	  of	  mathematics	  or	  languages.68	  	  For	   many	   students	   in	   secular	   schools,	   the	   teaching	   and	   prioritization	   of	  autonomy	  pose	  no	  problem.	  However,	   for	  some	  (but	  by	  no	  means	  all)	  religious	  students,	   the	   teaching	   and	   prioritization	   of	   autonomy,	   even	   in	   its	   facilitating	  context,	  may	  challenge	  and	  undermine	  certain	  aspects	  of	  their	  faith,	  for	  example	  by	  challenging	  the	  epistemological	  foundations	  of,	  say,	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  the	  revealed	  word	  of	  God.	   Furthermore,	   how	  would	   this	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	   education	   sit	  with	   the	   school	   curriculum	   in	   what	   are	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   as	  “faith	  schools”?	  While	  many	  of	  these	  schools	  may	  reject	  an	  autonomy-­‐promoting	  based	  curriculum,	  would	  they	  also	  place	  restrictions	  on	  autonomy-­‐facilitation	  if	  the	   results	   of	   such	   a	   programme	   included	   the	   questioning	   of	   fundamental	  beliefs?	  If	  so,	  would	  this	  mean	  they	  are	  to	  be	  deemed	  unreasonable	  and	  therefore	  excluded	  from	  Crowder’s	  value	  pluralist	   liberal	  polity?	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  religion	  should	  be	  assigned	  a	  privileged	  position	  within	  society,	  or	  excluded	  from	  critique.	   Indeed,	   within	   the	   modern	   liberal	   democratic	   polity,	   I	   believe	   that	  religion	   should	   be	   scrutinized,	   particularly	   with	   regards	   to	   both	   the	   public	  sphere	  and	  education.	  However,	  my	  point	  is	  that	  the	  restriction	  of	  autonomy	  to	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  its	  valuation	  solely	  as	  a	  political	  and	  instrumental	  good,	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  either	  Rawls	  or	  Crowder	  argue.	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Exclusion	  through	  Restriction	  This	   move	   towards	   the	   active	   promotion	   of	   autonomy	   has	   important	  implications	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state.	   If,	   given	   Berlin’s	   value	   pluralism,	  personal	   autonomy	   is	   a	   necessary	   attribute,	   then	   this	   presents,	  prima	   facie,	   an	  argument	   that	   the	   state	   ought	   not	   only	   to	   prevent	   restrictive	   actions	   that	  discourage	   the	   development	   of	   autonomy	   but	   also	   to	   actively	   promote	   its	  development.	   What	   is	   required	   is	   more	   than	   negative	   liberty	   regarding	   the	  development	   of	   autonomy;	   non-­‐interference	   in	   its	   own	   right	   does	   not	   go	   far	  enough.	  Crowder	  argues	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  liberal	  society	  outside	  the	   walls	   of	   a	   non-­‐liberal	   community	   will	   not	   prevent	   the	   restriction	   of	  autonomy	  within	  such	  non-­‐liberal	  communities.	  Such	  autonomous	  attributes	  are	  often	  actively	  discouraged,	  and	  various	  non-­‐liberal	  communities	  have	  developed	  effective	   means	   of	   isolating	   themselves	   from	   these	   external	   influences.69	  The	  Amish	  and	  Mennonite	  communities	  in	  America	  are	  obvious	  examples	  of	  groups	  who	   have	   been	   very	   successful	   in	   minimizing	   external	   influences	   that	   oppose	  their	  traditional	  beliefs.	  	  	  It	   is	   perhaps	   only	   now,	   after	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   Crowder’s	   particular	  interpretation	  of	  a	  pro-­‐autonomy	  liberalism	  premised	  upon	  value	  pluralism,	  that	  the	  tensions	  within	  it	  become	  evident.	  Value	  pluralism	  tends	  to	  oppose	  forms	  of	  perfectionist	   liberalism,	   such	   as	   Enlightenment	   liberalism,	   because	   they	   use	  autonomy	   as	   the	   ultimate	   value	   against	   which	   everything	   is	   measured.	   Value	  pluralism	  may,	   at	   least	   on	   an	   initial	   reading,	   suggest	   a	   form	   of	   liberalism	   that	  does	   not	   prioritize	   autonomy.	   But	   when	   Crowder’s	   liberal	   value	   pluralism	   is	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examined	   in	   more	   detail,	   we	   see	   that	   autonomy	   re-­‐emerges	   as	   a	   value	   of	  particular	  importance.	  	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   Crowder’s	   reformulation	   of	   autonomy	   takes	   on	   the	  same	   degree	   of	   importance	   as	   does	   a	   super-­‐value	   within	   a	   monist	   form	   of	  political	  association.	  Crowder	  prioritizes	  autonomy	  for	  instrumental	  rather	  than	  
metaphysical	  reasons;	  it	  is	  a	  value	  that	  enables	  individuals	  both	  to	  make	  choices	  for	  “a	  good	  reason”	  and	  to	  actively	  exercise	  their	  right	  of	  exit	  from	  groups	  as	  they	  see	   fit.	   As	   Crowder	   concludes,	   “the	   exigency	   of	   choosing	   well	   among	  incommensurables	   points	   to	   an	   emphasis	   on	   personal	   autonomy.”70	  In	   this	  context,	   Crowder	   shares	   with	   Rawls	   and	   Nussbaum	   an	   interpretation	   of	  autonomy	  that	  is	  not	  linked	  to	  a	  specific	  formulation	  of	  Kantian	  metaphysics	  but	  is,	   rather,	   implemented	  and	  valued	  as	  a	  political	   tool;	  not	   for	  what	  it	  is,	  but	   for	  
what	  it	  does.	  	  	  Accordingly,	   my	   argument	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   challenge	   the	   benefits	   of	   a	   pro-­‐autonomy	   account	   of	   liberalism.	   Indeed,	   I	   agree	  with	   Crowder’s	   belief	   that	   an	  individual’s	   capacity	   to	   make	   decisions	   for	   themselves,	   particularly	   among	  incommensurable	  options,	  is	  enhanced	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  reason	  autonomously.	  Furthermore,	   this	   ability	   to	   reason	   autonomously	   is	   bolstered	   by	   a	   robust	  account	   of	   freedom	   of	   exit	   combined	  with	   some	   form	   of	   autonomy-­‐facilitating	  education.	   However,	   while	   the	   autonomous	   individual	   that	   resides	   within	   the	  Crowderian	  liberal	  polity	  may	  be	  better	  equipped	  to	  make	  decisions	  when	  faced	  by	  incommensurable	  values,	  the	  number	  of	  values	  that	  may	  be	  open	  to	  them	  to	  choose	  from	  has	  been	  greatly	  reduced.	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  By	   assigning	   to	   autonomy	   (even	  when	   restricted	   to	   its	   instrumental	   aspect)	   a	  privileged	   position,	   Crowder’s	   liberal	   value	   pluralism	   is	   effectively	   pre-­‐determining	  the	  parameters	  of	  his	  liberal	  polity.	  It	  is	  only	  those	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  a	  liberal	  polity	  that	  upholds	  individual	  autonomy	  as	  a	  necessary	  public	  good	  who	  will	  be	  accepted.	  Those	  who,	   for	  whatever	   reason,	  do	  not	   share	   this	  specific	   liberal	   formulation	   will	   be	   forced	   either	   to	   modify	   their	   internal	  practices	   (and	   perhaps,	   ultimately,	   their	   beliefs),	   or	   alternatively	   to	   reject	   the	  liberal	  polity.	  	  	  The	  effect	  of	  pre-­‐determining	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  value	  pluralist	  liberal	  polity	  in	  such	   a	  way,	   either	   by	   design	   or	   by	   unintended	   consequence,	   is	   to	   restrict	   the	  forms	   of	   pluralism	   that	   can	   be	   successfully	   incorporated.	   Thus,	   the	   issue	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  forms	  of	  pluralism	  can	  be	  translated	  successfully	   into	   a	   liberal	   discourse	   and	   polity	   that	   intentionally	   promotes	  autonomy	   as	   both	   a	   public	   and	   a	   private	   good.	   If	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   forms	   of	  pluralism	   to	   be	   translated	   in	   such	   a	  way	   then	   they	   can	   be	   incorporated	   under	  Crowder’s	  value	  pluralist	  liberal	  paradigm.	  However,	  if	  they	  are	  either	  unwilling	  or	  unable,	  then	  according	  to	  Crowder’s	  analysis	  they	  cannot	  be	  incorporated.	  	  	  As	   we	   have	   already	   seen,	   Berlin’s	   thesis	   of	   value	   pluralism	   provides	   the	  foundation	  for	  both	  an	  ethical	  and	  a	  political	  defence	  of	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  values.	  However,	  Crowder’s	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  value	  pluralism	  excludes	  many	  of	  these	   values	   through	   his	   continued	   emphasis	   on	   autonomy.	   It	   is	   therefore	  my	  contention	   that	   a	   value	   pluralist	   liberal	   polity	   may	   have	   the	   potential	   to	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accommodate	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   values,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   specific	   form	   in	   which	  Crowder	  presents	  it.	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